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social conflict? This article argues that high-value natural resources can act as an 
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Introduction
What role does ethnicity play in contentious politics? A considerable litera-
ture has dealt with the importance of ethnic identity for the mobilization of 
social movements, protests, and other forms of contentious collective action. 
In the context of Latin America, indigenous identities have played an espe-
cially important role in contemporary political and social conflicts.1 It is less 
clear and highly contested, however, under which exact conditions identity 
politics contribute to conflict and which specific aspect of ethnic or indige-
nous identity matters most.
Ethnicity potentially promotes (armed) conflict through various causal 
mechanisms. Mobilizing on (perceived) relative deprivation of (Cederman, 
Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Gurr, 1970, 2000) or horizontal inequalities 
between ethnic groups (Østby, 2008) can facilitate collective action. 
Moreover, group leaders may instrumentalize ethnic identities for their own 
personal interests (Blimes, 2006; Østby, 2008; Wilkinson, 2004). Some 
authors have focused on demographic constellations of ethnic groups (Fearon 
& Laitin, 2003; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005), or their political exclu-
sion at the national level (Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). Other authors 
have used social movement theory to place an emphasis on framing processes 
for constructing contentious collective ethnic identity (McAdam, McCarthy, 
& Meyer, 1996) or have, more recently, combined constructivist approaches 
with the analysis of political opportunity structures, enabling collective eth-
nic action (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001).
This article aims to shed additional light on the role of group identities in 
social conflict by identifying more precisely the conditions under which eth-
nicity, specifically indigenous identity, leads to increased mobilization and 
conflict. To do so, we connect the literature on social conflict to current 
research on natural resource politics—a major theme in the wider armed con-
flict literature. We argue that the mobilization of indigenous identity is facili-
tated by the presence of high-value natural resources, which increase the 
“fixedness” of ethnicity as an identity category (Chandra, 2006) and raise the 
stakes of the underlying conflict. Natural resource exploitation acts as a cata-
lyst to activate frames of territorialized indigenous identities and therefore 
enables the implementation of disruptive contentious acts. Natural resources 
thus constitute an important contextual factor that affects whether indigenous 
identity becomes politicized and thus a major determinant of social conflict.
We test our argument in the context of Bolivian politics, a highly interest-
ing case for this purpose, as since the beginning of the 2000s, the ethnically 
heterogeneous country experienced substantially growing internal conflicts. 
While the escalating protests in 2003 were commonly labeled as a “gas war,” 
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the subsequent conflicts are often regarded as ethnically induced (Crabtree & 
Whitehead, 2008). Due to the lack of comprehensive empirical data on local 
conflicts in Bolivia, the interaction of natural resource exploitation, ethnicity, 
and conflict dynamics has so far not been analyzed in a quantitative, spatially 
disaggregated way.
To fill this research gap, we empirically analyze contentious politics in 
Bolivia using original sub-national data from Bolivian provinces. Based on 
detailed Bolivian newspaper records, we create a new comprehensive data set 
of social conflict events for each of Bolivia’s 112 provinces from 2000 to 
2011. We complement our event data with additional information on the eth-
nic/indigenous composition of the local population from the Bolivian census, 
allowing us to create detailed measures of indigenous identity that capture 
important dimensions of the concept. Focusing our analysis on Bolivia’s 
most important export commodity—gas—which accounts for 46% of the 
total national exports as of 2012 (UN Comtrade), we add geo-spatial infor-
mation on major gas fields, as well as a host of further covariates from vari-
ous sources.
Using time-series cross-sectional count models, we document that the 
population share of indigenous people has no statistically significant effect 
on social conflict for provinces without gas resources. We do find, however, 
a positive and statistically significant effect of the indigenous population 
share on social conflict for provinces with gas. These findings are confirmed 
in a series of additional robustness checks. Consistent with our theoretical 
expectations, the combination of high-value natural resource extraction with 
a local potential for indigenous mobilization is an important driver for social 
conflict in Bolivian provinces.
This article makes several valuable contributions to the existing literature. 
First, our argument adds to the broader research literature on social conflict 
by highlighting the important catalytic effect of natural resources for indige-
nous mobilization. By doing so, we also identify relevant points of connec-
tion between parallel research programs on armed conflict and contentious 
politics, which have been neglected so far. Similarly, most research on the 
link between natural resources and conflict narrowly focuses on armed con-
flict or civil war, largely ignoring the role of non-violent or low-intensity 
violent resistance against the state. Second, our empirical analysis substanti-
ates our conditional argument using novel quantitative and disaggregated 
data, which has not been the norm in studies of contentious politics. Given 
the strategic importance of non-renewable natural resource exploitation and 
indigenous rights movements across the globe—and especially in low-
income countries—our findings not only fill an important research gap, but 
may also be of practical relevance for policy advice. Third, our article also 
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makes a crucial contribution to the specific discourse on contentious politics 
in Bolivia, providing, for the first time, a comprehensive quantitative over-
view on the spatial distribution of conflict events, allowing us to put existing 
arguments in the literature on Bolivia into a broader context.
Ethnicity, Natural Resources, and Contentious 
Politics
A large body of literature has dealt with the importance of ethnic identity for 
mobilization of social movements, protests, and violent contentious politics. 
This research does not conclusively demonstrate under which specific condi-
tions ethnicity leads to social conflict.
Without intending to capture all aspects of the broad discussion on ethnic-
ity and contention, the arguments of the central theoretical approaches can be 
summarized as follows: Instrumentalist approaches stress the importance of 
social movement leaders, who use ethnic identities to compete for economic 
or political power and to overcome the collective action problem (Brass, 
1991; Melucci, 1996; for an overview, see also Barker, Johnson, & Lavalette, 
2001).
The political opportunity approach, by contrast, shifts its focus to the 
influence of (changing) political structures that enable or inhibit ethnic mobi-
lization and conflict. Thus, several studies have highlighted the importance of 
specific institutional and legal arrangements or, more specifically, studied the 
impact of ethnic parties on contentious politics (Tarrow, 1994; Wilkinson, 
2004).
Drawing on constructivist perspectives, social movement approaches 
have also emphasized the relevance of framing processes in the sense of 
“symbolic and discursive dimensions of [ethnic] mobilization” (Vermeersch, 
2011, p. 18; see for example, McAdam et al., 1996). Different interpretations 
of cultural and/or ideological symbols and their—more or less successful—
adaptation to specific political and social contexts can be used to legitimize 
collective contentious action. More recent social movement studies often 
combine political opportunity approaches with the analysis of framing pro-
cesses, arguing that the perception of opportunities can change. Only when a 
certain political or social context is perceived or interpreted as “opportunity,” 
can it actually be used for purposes of mobilization (Goodwin & Jasper, 
2003).
Mostly focusing on violent conflict, the “grievance” school finally high-
lights the importance of (perceived) political inequalities or exclusion that 
coincide with ethnic cleavages, and thus may facilitate mobilization for con-
flict (Esteban, Mayoral, & Ray, 2012; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009). 
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For example, using a new comprehensive data set on Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR), Wimmer et al. (2009) show in cross-country analyses that armed con-
flict is more likely when large sections of the population are excluded from 
central state power on the basis of their ethnic identity. Considering the 
impact of economic grievances of ethnic groups, empirical results have 
shown that relative economic deprivation may also explain ethnic mobiliza-
tion for violence (see, for example, Drury, 1994; Østby, 2008).
All these studies focus on the importance of ethnic identity and the associ-
ated mobilization potential for social conflict. They all implicitly or explicitly 
highlight the importance of contextual factors that enable mobilization based 
on ethnic identity. Although various factors can be important, for example, 
the political exclusion of identity groups, so far only few analyses have sys-
tematically studied the role of natural resource exploitation as such a contex-
tual factor for contentious ethnic politics.
Meanwhile, there exists a related substantial body of empirical research 
on the impact of natural resources on the dynamics of civil war and violent 
conflicts (e.g., Humphreys, 2005; Le Billon, 2001; Ross, 2004). More recent 
research investigates the influence of intervening contextual factors for the 
relationship between natural resources and armed conflict—or its absence 
(see, for example, Basedau & Lay, 2009; Fjelde, 2009; Le Billon, 2012; Ross, 
2012). Explicit quantitative studies on the interaction of natural resources 
with different dimensions of ethnicity are still rare, but the few existing 
examples suggest a potential for useful, novel insights. For example, a study 
of Sorens (2011) concludes that the geographical overlap of ethnic minority 
groups and oil production increases the probability of secessionist conflict. 
Koos and Basedau (2012) also provide evidence for increased conflict risk 
for African localities that combine uranium extraction with settlements of 
politically excluded groups. However, Basedau and Pierskalla (2014) find 
that this result does not extend to oil extraction in Africa.
In contrast, natural resources have, until recently, hardly been analyzed as 
causes of contentious politics in social movement research mainly dealing 
with low or non-violent contention.2 Only lately have authors examined, for 
example, the specific impact of large infrastructure projects, such as liquefied 
natural gas terminals (Boudet & Ortolano, 2010; McAdam et al., 2010), but 
without comprehensively considering the interactive impact of ethnic 
identities.
Conflict Studies on Bolivia
The largely qualitative literature on contentious collective action in Bolivia 
and the wider Latin American region has to some extent engaged the issues 
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of ethnic and indigenous identity and natural resource exploitation for the 
formation of social conflicts. Since the 2000s, this literature has generally 
developed a strong focus on social—particularly indigenous—movements 
and parties (see Madrid, 2012; Postero & Zamosc, 2004; Schorr, 2012; Van 
Cott, 2003, 2005; Yashar, 2005). These analyses mainly aim to explain the 
historical increase of indigenous movements, highlighting the explanatory 
factor of political opportunity structures, particularly of decentralization, the 
decline of the traditional left, and increasingly relevant global indigenous 
rights networks (van Cott, 2005, 2006; Yashar, 2005).
By focusing more precisely on contentious collective action, some sub-
national conflict analyses can be found for specific regions within Bolivia. 
Bebbington and Bebbington (2010), studying conflict dynamics in the gas-
producing department of Tarija in 2008, argue that the central causes of con-
flict have been (perceived) local grievances in the context of (plans for) 
changes in gas revenue distribution, and the successful mobilization of 
regional identities. Eaton (2007) studies the regional autonomy movement 
and related conflicts in the department of Santa Cruz and concludes that these 
conflicts can be traced back to grievances of the economic elite, and the dis-
appearance of national political parties representing the regional interests of 
the local elite.
Moreover, several micro-level analyses have qualitatively studied the 
broader impact of gas production on local indigenous communities 
(Bebbington, 2012; Hinojosa, 2012; Perreault, 2008).
A recently published study explicitly aims to analyze the impact of ethnic 
cleavages and natural resources (viz., gas production) on the overall conflict 
dynamics in Bolivia: Barndt (2012) analyzes the causes of two episodes of a 
national rise of violent confrontations and finds that the emergence of these 
violent confrontations cannot be traced back either to resource dependence or 
to ethnicity, but is related to sector-specific income shocks caused by govern-
ment policies which “threatened to undercut the livelihood of a well-orga-
nized sector” (Barndt, 2012, pp. 19-20). Partially contradicting, Evia, 
Laserna, and Skaperdas (2008) suggest that the rise of conflict levels during 
the last decade, and especially since the government of Evo Morales, can be 
traced back to decreasing state capacity in the context of increased resource 
dependence and rentier-state mechanisms (see also Laserna, 2010).
Based on novel conflict data, gathered from extensive newspaper and 
radio review since the end of 2009, a publication of the Fundación UNIR 
(2012) provides a highly disaggregated—though mainly descriptive—con-
flict analysis. Central findings are first a high geographical concentration of 
conflicts in the major cities (UNIR, 2012). Moreover, categorizing the con-
flicts according to different demands of the principal groups of actors, the 
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study underlines “economic demands” as most important claim (see UNIR, 
2012, p. 112). “Natural resources and environment” range at seventh place 
but they are classified as increasingly important matters of conflict (UNIR, 
2012, p. 49).3
Overall, there exists some preliminary evidence that ethnicity or ethnic 
mobilization in interaction with natural resources, especially gas, might be an 
important cause of social conflicts in Bolivia. This evidence is contested by 
other studies, however. Due to the lack of more comprehensive conflict data, 
this interplay has so far not been examined in a more structured way. There 
only exist studies of, for example, one specific sub-region of Bolivia or of 
one particular type of conflict—without a reference to the overall conflict 
dynamics within the country, and rather focusing on situational causes of 
conflict dynamics.
Natural Resources as Catalyst for Indigenous 
Mobilization
Building on some of the qualitative studies on Bolivia, and on more recent 
quantitative studies on the interaction of natural resources with different 
dimensions of ethnicity (Koos & Basedau, 2012; Sorens, 2011), we argue 
that neither indigenous identity frames alone, nor natural resource exploita-
tion can sufficiently explain the patterns of contentious politics. To develop a 
better understanding of when indigenous identity leads to more social con-
flict, we have to specify more precisely how resource extraction interacts 
with identity politics.
Research on ethnic identity suggests that shared ethnicity can facilitate 
collective action of groups because of three basic causal mechanisms, which, 
following the classification of Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and 
Weinstein (2007) can be defined as preferences, technology, and strategy 
selection mechanisms. Thus, members of one ethnic group might share simi-
lar preferences over political outcomes and values, or simply express higher 
degrees of altruism toward co-ethnics. Technology mechanisms describe the 
ability to overcome collective action problems via improving in-group com-
munication through shared culture, language, or modes of interaction 
(Deutsch, 1966). Moreover, co-ethnics might also be easier to identify in 
ones’ social networks and hence better suited for organizing collective activi-
ties. Last, strategy selection, substantiated by the social sanctioning mecha-
nism, assumes that homogeneity within one ethnic group produces shared 
norms and institutions of cooperation, as well as sanctioning of non-contrib-
uters (Habyarimana et al., 2007).
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The mere existence of ethnic and indigenous identities is not a strong 
enough reason to expect an increase in contentious politics. We have to deter-
mine why and under which conditions ethnicity emerges as a powerful vehi-
cle for contentious politics.
Chandra (2006) points out that one of the core characteristics that distin-
guish ethnic identity from other identity frames is “constrained change” (p. 
414), which means that ethnic identity is malleable, but less so than many 
other available identity frames. This semi-malleability of ethnic identity can 
be illustrated quite well in several Latin American countries where substan-
tial parts of the population consider themselves to be indigenous but—
depending on the context—that identity might only be of subordinated 
relevance in comparison with other, partly crosscutting group identities, such 
as class structures or sub-regional identities (see Canessa, 2007; Cleary, 
2000).4 Chandra (2006) further points out that many theories that link ethnic 
identities to conflict behavior, like the security dilemma in multiethnic societ-
ies (Posen, 1993) or amplified emotional responses in between-group con-
flicts (Petersen, 2002), fail to convince as such, because they rely on the 
assumption of fixed group membership, instead of constrained change.
Without fixedness of identity, there is no reason to resort to (violent) con-
tention, as individuals can change their group memberships, thus generating 
heterogeneity within identity groups. The notion of constrained change sug-
gests though that factors that increase the fixedness of identity, and thus more 
strongly constrain fluidity of group membership, should amplify the conflict 
potential of indigenous identity frames. When change is limited, classic in- 
versus out-group dynamics can arise (Tajfel, 1974) and the mechanisms iden-
tified by Habyarimana et al. (2007) can operate to actually facilitate collective 
action.
The core contribution of our theoretical argument is to contend that natural 
resources can limit the malleability of indigenous, and more generally ethnic, 
identity and second, raise the stakes of political confrontations, making it 
more likely that actors engage in forms of contentious politics.
Why do natural resources, concretely gas extraction, increase the fixed-
ness of indigenous group identity? We argue that local resource exploitation 
can serve as an important local unifying frame for indigenous mobilization, 
by strengthening the identity of groups from within, as well as influencing 
behavior of external actors (energy companies and especially governments) 
toward indigenous populations. Natural resource extraction adds a stronger 
territorial component to ethnic and indigenous identity frames. Resource 
extraction is often concentrated in particular regions of a country. In Bolivia, 
the main areas of natural gas exploitation are in the departments of Tarija, 
Santa Cruz, and several provinces in Cochabamba and Chuquisaca. Given 
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that settlement patterns of ethnic groups usually cluster geographically, natu-
ral resource extraction in specific regions often coincides with the presence 
of a fairly homogeneous population already sharing an ethnic identity frame. 
The presence of valuable natural resources creates stronger incentives for 
identification on a combined ethno-territorial basis for several reasons. For 
one, natural resources, especially oil and gas, often generate large govern-
ment revenues that can be claimed by the ethno-territorial group. Furthermore, 
resource extraction often has important environmental consequences that 
endanger the traditional livelihood of the local population. This is especially 
true for individuals belonging to indigenous identity groups, as indigenous 
people still engage more often in agricultural activities, and often emphasize 
a stronger emotional bond to their “homeland” (Hinojosa, 2008, p. 15).5 
Natural resource extraction intensifies the link between indigenous identity 
and territorial location, adding an important additional requirement to group 
membership, which overall reduces the ability for “constrained change” 
across identity categories. In the presence of resource extraction, identifying 
as “Quechua” or “Guaraní,” for example, more strongly conflates ideas of a 
specific ancestry, language ability, cultural practices, but also place of living 
and an agricultural lifestyle that is negatively affected by environmental 
changes associated with gas exploitation.
Natural resources, apart from internal incentives to strengthen and fix 
indigenous identity, also provide external incentives. Conflicts over revenues 
generated by natural resources or the environmental damage associated with 
production usually involve outside actors, like the national government or 
large corporations. Such actors are often perceived as intruders, with no legit-
imate claim to the spoils of the land. For instance, in the course of our field-
work in the Bolivian gas-extracting areas, a frame that has commonly been 
referenced by indigenous representatives during interviews was the contrast-
ing of a “pre-colonial” or “ancestral” local indigenous community on one 
hand, and an “imposing” government on the other.6
This framing of insiders versus outsiders is further strengthened by the 
desire of the government (or companies) to engage representatives of local 
indigenous groups. The need to present oneself as a cohesive unit vis-á-vis 
the outside world, for example to attain special indigenous legal rights, 
increased revenue allocations, or simply to be represented at the bargaining 
table, creates additional incentives to delineate indigenous-territorial identi-
ties more clearly. The search for identifiable negotiation partners and an over-
all sense of an outsider-versus-insider dynamic thus fosters a unified identity. 
For example, once the government takes note of local protests against gas 
exploitation, the mere fact of political attention or intervention by an outside 
force can amalgamate and energize the emergence of a cohesive indigenous 
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identity at the local level in opposition to the perceived outsiders. This will 
also have implications for the capacity of contentious action beyond the nar-
row resource extraction issue, but more generally against the government.
Apart from reducing the malleability and salience of indigenous identity, 
high-value natural resource extraction such as gas also raises the stakes of the 
ensuing political conflict. Once natural resources are used to activate and 
strengthen indigenous identities, the associated grievances over revenue dis-
tribution and environmental damage limit the available range of acceptable 
bargaining outcomes. From the perspective of indigenous groups, natural 
resource extraction becomes associated with economic survival and issues of 
ownership over traditional homelands. Indigenous claims over territory cre-
ate issues of indivisibility in the sense that mechanisms of territorial distribu-
tion become at least sharply limited (Hassner, 2003; Toft, 2002).7
Although issues of indivisibility also may hold true for ethnic and indig-
enous groups in non-resource rich regions (Toft, 2002), we argue that resource 
extraction intensifies the probability of contention, as it implies an additional 
concrete contestation over territory in the context of new intruding actors 
(state or multinational companies), which otherwise would not have been 
present.
For these outside actors, large economic rents are at stake. Raising the 
stakes makes it unlikely both sides can find an acceptable bargain in a negoti-
ated solution and increases the chances of resorting to disruptive and coercive 
means.
Once contentious actions are carried out in high-value resource producing 
areas, local indigenous groups enjoy increased bargaining leverage as com-
pared with most non-resource producing area. Given the economic desirabil-
ity or even the strategic relevance of natural resource extraction, the 
government is highly susceptible to typical forms of contentious politics, 
such as blocking of essential roads, hindering direct access to extraction sites 
or refineries, sabotaging pipelines or disrupting other aspects of the business. 
This exerts direct pressure on the government, which translates to elevated 
bargaining power, even concerning issues of contestation rather unrelated to 
natural resource extraction.
To summarize, we argue that without natural resource exploitation, and 
especially high-valuable resources, indigenous identity frames might be pres-
ent, but cannot be easily used to realize their mobilization potential. With 
natural resources though, indigenous identity becomes an important vehicle 
for mobilization, and due to the increased “fixedness” and political stakes 
associated with resource extraction, social conflict becomes more likely. In 
essence, natural resources can operate as a catalyst for the political mobiliza-
tion of ethnic identity. We thus follow up on the argument of Aspinall’s study 
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of violent (separatist) conflict (Aspinall, 2007) that only the entanglement of 
natural resource exploitation and territorialized ethnic identity provokes conten-
tious collective action. While Aspinall compares three subnational cases of 
resource-rich provinces in Indonesia and assumes that “wider processes of iden-
tity construction” (p. 951) are decisive for the occurrence or absence of violence, 
this study quantitatively tests the argument that (local) natural resource exploita-
tion serves as a necessary catalyst for local political mobilization of ethnic iden-
tities. Thus, the central hypothesis we test in our article is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Natural resources condition the effect of indigenous iden-
tity on social conflict. Without natural resources, there is no clear effect on 
social conflict events. With natural resources, activated frames of indige-
nous identity will increase levels of social conflict.
Measuring Contentious Politics in Bolivia, 2000-
2011
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the political situation in Bolivia has 
been characterized by growing internal instability and conflicts. After several 
waves of protest, two presidents have been forced out of office. In 2006, Evo 
Morales, a cocalero of Aymara origin, became the first indigenous president 
in the history of the country. The first few years of his government have been 
characterized by the elaboration and highly contested implementation of a 
new constitution, which precipitated deep political and economic changes 
(finally approved by a national referendum in January 2009). This process of 
political transformation has been accompanied by a high level of internal 
conflicts, albeit at a rather low level of violence in the sense of fatalities.
As already indicated above, comprehensive data on internal conflicts in 
Bolivia are rare. The country is barely listed within the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP) conflict data set,8 and is not included in the Armed 
Conflict Location and Events Data set (ACLED). The Bolivian research 
institute Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Económica y Social (CERES) has 
created a data set that covers conflict information for Bolivia from 1970 up to 
the present, but does not feature structured sub-national disaggregation, and 
thus cannot account for explaining differences in the level of conflict and 
their causes between various regions. The Fundación UNIR has published a 
highly disaggregated conflict data set,9 but the data only cover the period 
since the end of 2009. Due to the lack of conflict information for Bolivia, we 
created a new data set.
As a data source, we use the detailed narrative “conflict chronologies” of 
CLACSO, the Latin American Council of Social Sciences, a well-known 
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non-governmental international organization. Through the Observatorio 
Social de América Latina (OSAL) CLACSO draws on a detailed monthly 
chronology of social conflicts in 19 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean from January 2000 until 2012—based on a scanning of major 
Bolivian newspapers.10
A province conflict event, the basic entry of the data set, is defined as the 
occurrence of a (violent or non-violent) collective activity—beyond formal 
governmental institutions—stating an incompatibility with government par-
ties, employers, or other (identity) groups of society that takes place through 
a continuous period of time at one specific geographical location, where the 
crucial level of spatial disaggregation is the province level, the second admin-
istrative division in Bolivia.11 We include all forms of social conflict, not just 
events that were explicitly related to ethnic or indigenous identity or natural 
resources. We follow this approach for two major reasons. For one, the under-
lying news reports do not always specify whether specific indigenous groups 
were involved. Furthermore, at the core of our analysis is a comparison of 
provinces with and without natural resources, as well as with varying size of 
the indigenous population. If we were to exclude social conflict events unre-
lated to natural resources, we would be unable to determine whether the level 
of contentious politics in resource-rich provinces with a large indigenous 
population is really higher than in a province without these two characteris-
tics. As laid out in our theoretical argument on the catalytic effect of gas 
extraction on indigenous contentious politics we do, moreover, assume that 
this effect has broader long-term implications concerning the probability of 
contentious action beyond the narrow resource extraction issue. Nevertheless, 
we do repeat our analysis only including conflict events that were classified 
as related to natural resources in our robustness checks.
The coded variables in our data (date, location, groups of actors, conflict 
issues, type, and intensity of conflict, etc.) build on the codebook of SCAD, 
the Social Conflict in Africa Database, and of the UCDP to ensure consis-
tency and compatibility with other prevalent conflict data sets. However, 
various adjustments and supplements according to the special research inter-
est of the research project at hand have been made.12
Descriptive results of our conflict data concerning conflict dynamics can 
be summarized as follows: The total number of province conflict events for 
the period of 2000 to 2011 is 3,731. The number of deaths related to these 
conflict events is rather low. We count 208 deaths for the whole period—
almost half of it in the province Murillo, where the capital of Bolivia is 
located.13 The numerical dominance of conflicts in this province also holds 
true for the absolute number of conflict events, albeit its overall share 
decreases from 28% to 17% comparing the periods 2000-2005 and 
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2006-2011, respectively. There is, moreover, a marked increase in conflict 
events since the year 2006 (see Figure 1), which is temporarily interrupted 
during the years 2009 and 2010.
Apart from the capital province, there are several other provinces with a 
markedly high number of conflict events. These provinces are Cercado in 
Cochabamba, Andrés Ibáñez in Santa Cruz, Oropeza in Chuquisaca, Cercado 
in Oruro—all of them provinces where the capitals of the departments are 
located—and beyond Quillacollo and Chapare in Cochabamba, Aroma en La 
Paz, Gran Chaco in Tarija, and Ichilo in Santa Cruz. Figure 2 depicts a map 
that shows the distribution of the total of conflict events across provinces.
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Figure 1. Conflict events in Bolivia.
Figure 2. Total conflict events in Bolivian provinces.
Darker tones indicate higher quantiles.
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Our new, highly disaggregated conflict data set allows for a more detailed, 
quantitative analysis, which has a better capacity to detect structural causes 
of local conflicts in Bolivia.
Methodology and Research Design
To test our hypothesis, we rely on a disaggregated analysis of conflict dynam-
ics in the 112 provinces of Bolivia between 2000 and 2011. Provinces are the 
second administrative division in Bolivia; the country is composed of 9 
departments, which are subdivided into 5 (department of Pando) and up to 20 
(department of La Paz) provinces. Disaggregation to the province allows us 
to trace social conflict dynamics at a much more fine-grained level.
Our period of observation ranges from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 
2011; we choose this time frame, as the year 2000 is generally regarded as the 
beginning of the increase in internal conflicts in Bolivia (Schorr, 2012). 
Moreover, we simply were not able to study conflict dynamics before the 
year 2000 as the data collection of CLACSO only starts in 2000.
Concerning social conflict data, we made use of our novel conflict data 
set, described above. As our main dependent variable, we use a simple count 
for total conflict events for each province-year. For our robustness checks, we 
also code the number of events explicitly related to non-renewable resources 
and the number of injured people.
To measure the presence of natural resources, we restrict ourselves to 
information on natural gas. Although many aspects of our argument could 
also apply to other types of natural resources (e.g., mining), we focus on natu-
ral gas for three major reasons. First, natural gas is the most important natural 
resource for Bolivia, with the largest fiscal implications. Gas presents more 
than 40% of the total national exports. Governmental revenue from the gas 
sector has risen significantly, especially after the re-nationalization of the 
hydrocarbon sector in 2006, which increased the government’s take of gas 
revenues substantially. Gas revenues have grown from US$288 million in 
2004 to US$1.572 billion in 2007 (Weissbrot & Sandoval, 2008). Gas has 
also played an important role in political conflicts throughout the 2000s 
according to several qualitative studies summarized in “Conflict Studies on 
Bolivia” section. Moreover, we have geo-referenced data on the sub-national 
location of gas reserves, which we can match to our conflict data, whereas the 
same is not available for mining operations.14 In contrast to existing legal 
regulations within the mining sector, substantial parts of the government rev-
enues of the gas sector have for a long time been re-transferred to sub-national 
political entities of the gas-producing regions (departmental prefectures and 
recently increasingly municipalities).15
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This type of institutionalized revenue sharing might be considered a factor 
that additionally increases the fixedness of territorialized indigenous (and 
non-indigenous) group identities in the gas-producing areas—often with the 
central government seen as adversary. With regard to the generalizability of 
our findings, this means that the effect of other resources on indigenous 
mobilization might be somewhat weaker than with reference to gas extrac-
tion. Nevertheless, the impact should principally be the same, as the other 
mechanisms outlined above still apply to non-gas resources.
Our information on natural gas exploitation is derived from the PETRO-
DATA data set (Lujala, Rød, & Thieme, 2007). PETRO-DATA provides geo-
spatial information on oil and gas deposits around the world. We match gas 
fields from PETRO-DATA to Bolivian provinces and create a simple, time-
invariant count of gas deposits for each province, ranging from zero gas 
fields to a maximum of two per province.16 Although rather coarse, this count 
captures the main differences between Bolivia’s provinces. Ideally, we would 
like to have exact production figures to be able to differentiate better across 
time, but these data are unavailable to the public. As an alternative to PETRO-
DATA, we also add newer information on the location of gas deposits from 
the Bolivian Ministry of Hydrocarbons and Energy. As some exploration has 
taken place in the period of study, we only use this alternative indicator for 
robustness checks to avoid post-treatment bias.
Data on ethnicity and indigenous identity are taken from the last Bolivian 
census of the year 2001—according to which roughly 62% of the population 
self-identified as belonging to an indigenous people. The largest indigenous 
groups are Quechua and Aymara with 31% and 25%, respectively, of the total 
population; other indigenous minorities, comprising Chiquitanos (2.2%), 
Guaraní (1.6%), and Mojeños (0.9%), and further smaller ethnic groups. The 
census of 2001 aggregates the remaining part of the population under the 
category of “non-indigenous” without further specification. In contrast to 
other authors (see Madrid, 2012) we use indigenous self-identification as 
point of reference, not the use of a certain language, as we think that self-
identification catches best the dimension of ethnicity as potential mobiliza-
tion tool. We are aware of the shortcomings and justifiable criticisms put 
forward against the ethnic classifications within the Bolivian census (see, for 
example, Schilling-Vacaflor, 2010; Zuazo, 2006), especially with regard to 
the simplistic categorization covering up ethnic (sub-)cleavages. Still, the 
census is the most comprehensive, highly disaggregated data source for eth-
nicity, which is currently available for Bolivia.
Based on the census, we calculate the share of the indigenous and non-
indigenous population for each province, as well as the share of specific indi-
geneous groups (Aymara, Quechua, and Guaraní). Although we do not 
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believe that the sheer size of indigenous groups directly affects social conflict 
as such, we use the share of the indigenous, because it proxies fairly well the 
mobilization potential of indigenous identity (see Cederman et al., 2010, for 
a similar argument about ethnic group size). A small share of indigenous 
people makes it unlikely that a unified and territorialized identity emerges at 
the local level, while also limiting its disruptive potential. A province nearly 
completely dominated by indigenous people is much more likely to experi-
ence a territorial politicization of their identity and furthermore represents a 
much larger potential for disruptive mobilization.
To be able to distinguish the mobilization potential of indigenous identity 
from other more general aspects of indigenous identity, we furthermore 
exploit the census data to construct important control variables. First, based 
on the ethnic head counts for the major groups identified in the census (Non-
indigenous, Aymara, Quechua, Guaraní), we calculate a standard index of 
ethnic/indigenous fractionalization, as well as a measure of ethnic/indigenous 
polarization (Esteban & Ray, 1994), that captures the degree to which main 
groups balance each other.
To measure potential grievances of indigenous groups, we add informa-
tion from the EPR data set, which contains systematic information on the 
access to national political power of ethnic groups from 1945 to 2009 
(Cederman et al., 2010). Recent work by Cederman et al. has shown that the 
political exclusion of identity groups is an important determinant of the out-
break of armed conflicts and hence might play a similar role for social con-
flicts. We believe this to be an especially important control variable, because 
political exclusion at the national level might confound the relationship 
between the potential for indigenous mobilization, resource extraction, and 
social conflict. Based on the indigenous group shares calculated from census 
data and the national-level status of each group from EPR, we create a vari-
able that measures the share of the local provincial population that is repre-
sented at the national level. Due to the election of Evo Morales and the 
associated change in the cabinet, as well as the varying shares of indigenous 
groups across provinces, our indicator of political inclusion varies spatially 
and temporally.
Last, we use information on spoken languages from the census to calculate 
a measure of “cross-cuttingness” (Selway, 2011). If language is an important 
alternative identity cleavage (Bormann, Cederman, & Vogt, 2013) that does 
not perfectly align with self-reported indigenous identity, it might serve as a 
weakening factor for ethnic mobilization. For each province, we calculate the 
correlation between self-identified indigenous identity and the ability to 
speak an indigenous language.
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To parse out the effect of indigenous identity and natural resources, we 
control for a number of additional variables. We include population counts 
for each province, as more populous provinces are more likely to experience 
social conflict (see Dixon, 2009). We also add information on literacy rates 
and an index of socio-economic development based on census data.18 To cap-
ture other aspects of political and geographic opportunity structures, we add 
information on the extent of the road network (based on GIS files), distance 
to the capital city, and the share of mountainous terrain.19 Provinces closer to 
La Paz, with better road networks and more accessible terrain might be more 
likely to experience social conflict, because civil society actors have lower 
costs of organizing collective action. For our robustness checks, we use infor-
mation on government revenue in each of the provinces. Our measure is 
based on total government revenue allocations to municipalities, which are 
nested into provinces. We calculate the total allocation to municipalities in 
each province-year and normalize by population size. This is not a perfect 
measure for total government expenditures in each province, because it does 
not capture allocations to the departmental level, which might be used for 
differing infrastructure expenditures in distinct provinces. Nonetheless, we 
believe this proxy reasonably reflects fiscal inequities between Bolivian 
provinces (remaining variation will partially be controlled for via department 
fixed effects). Controlling for government revenues might be important 
because fiscal allocations can be used to buy the acquiescence of minority 
groups, especially in regions rich in natural resources. We relegate models 
including this variable to the section on robustness checks, because we only 
have financial information available for the years 2006 to 2011.20
As our dependent variable is a count of social conflict events in each prov-
ince-year, we rely on negative binomial count models for our estimations. 
The linear predictor is a function of covariates in the following way:
η β δit it i i i i t kx e g e g year dept= + + + ×( ) + +θ γ .
The specification includes our measure of indigenous mobilization poten-
tial ei , the count of gas fields gi , and their interaction ( ).e gi i×  Testing our 
hypothesis will depend on the set of coefficients [ , , ]θ γ δ . The model also 
includes control variables xit , year effects and, in some instances, depart-
mental dummies. The year dummies account for uniform time shocks that 
might affect overall levels of conflicts in Bolivia in specific years. The 
departmental dummies control for common, time-constant factors shared by 
provinces within the same department that might correlate with our main 
independent variables and levels of social conflict.21 We cluster standard 
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errors at the provincial level to account for arbitrary serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity.22
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents our main results.
Column (1) shows the results for our baseline negative binomial model. 
For the control variables, we can see that several coefficients are statistically 
significant below the 5% level and behave in an expected way. Provinces 
with higher population counts are more likely to experience conflict events. 
Similarly, higher levels of socio-economic development are associated with 
more events. This might be due to the empowering nature of access to socio-
economic resources, enabling individuals to overcome collective action 
problems (see McAdam et al., 2010). Provinces with a better road network 
also have, on average, more events. We find a weakly significant (below the 
10% level), negative effect for capital distance.
Moving to our main variables of interest, we have to keep in mind that the 
substantive interpretation of the constituent and interaction terms is difficult. 
First, we are dealing with a generalized linear model and need to simulate 
meaningful quantities of interest. Second, the inclusion of interaction effects 
implies that we cannot interpret the constituent terms as partial effects. What 
we can tell from the coefficients in the regression table though is that prov-
inces with a higher share of indigenous groups are neither more nor less 
likely to experience an increase in social conflict events when gas is absent in 
the province. The coefficient is negative, but far from statistically significant 
at standard levels. The constituent term for gas is negative and statistically 
significant, but fairly meaningless as it only applies to provinces without any 
indigenous population. The interaction term itself is positive and statistically 
significant below the 1% level, suggesting that there exists a meaningful dif-
ference in the effects of the share of the indigenous population on conflict 
between provinces with and without gas. To better adjudicate the direction 
and magnitude of the effects, we simulate the expected number of conflict 
events as a function of the share of the indigenous population under two sce-
narios: for a province without any gas and for an identical province with the 
maximum number of gas fields, that is, two.23 Figure 3 shows the average 
effect and shaded in gray the associated 95% confidence intervals.
There is no effect of the share of the indigenous population on conflict 
events without the presence of gas (light gray). The slope is slightly negative 
but the 95% confidence intervals are wide. Without gas, indigenous identity 
seems to play no discernible role for contentious politics in Bolivia. We con-
trast this with the simulated effects of the indigenous share in a province with 
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gas (dark gray). Now, the effect is clearly positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Importantly, the confidence regions for the two scenarios do not overlap 
Table 1. Social Conflict in Bolivia.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 NegBin NegBin NegBin NegBin NegBin NegBin
log(Population) 0.312** 0.312** 0.368** 0.355** 0.357** 0.403**
 (0.116) (0.119) (0.116) (0.124) (0.124) (0.143)
Socio-economic 
development
4.238*** 4.265*** 3.912*** 4.162*** 3.581*** 3.437***
 (0.791) (0.788) (0.773) (0.820) (0.701) (0.685)
Literacy 1.271 0.989 0.810 1.099 3.707*** 3.187*
 (1.119) (1.124) (1.297) (1.197) (1.126) (1.250)
% mountainous 0.0125 0.200 −0.0357 −0.134 −0.849† −0.653
 (0.297) (0.315) (0.341) (0.338) (0.512) (0.500)
Capital distance −0.00138† −0.00131† −0.00130† −0.00118 −0.00192* −0.00156†
 (0.000724) (0.000733) (0.000706) (0.000720) (0.000842) (0.000824)
Road density 0.0125** 0.0113** 0.0129** 0.0127** 0.0139*** 0.0120***
 (0.00410) (0.00427) (0.00403) (0.00422) (0.00364) (0.00348)
Gas −0.786** −0.743** −0.712** −0.829** −0.683* −0.580*
 (0.246) (0.254) (0.245) (0.263) (0.266) (0.241)
% indigenous −0.290 −0.815 −0.371 0.0954 −0.403 −0.653
 (0.475) (0.497) (0.493) (0.495) (0.613) (0.694)
Gas × % indigenous 1.808*** 1.816*** 1.455* 1.593** 1.285** 1.099*
 (0.469) (0.487) (0.568) (0.511) (0.484) (0.524)
Government inclusion −1.277*** −1.228***
 (0.235) (0.235)
Ethnic fractionalization −0.521 −0.193
 (0.549) (0.659)
Ethnic polarization 0.389 0.306
 (0.428) (0.455)
Crosscuttingness 1.019 0.117
 (0.683) (0.650)
Constant −4.962** −4.389* −4.898* −5.800** −6.082** −6.180**
 (1.897) (1.912) (2.030) (1.971) (2.064) (2.220)
  
log(α) 0.172 0.228† 0.215 0.176 0.422** 0.496**
 (0.127) (0.132) (0.135) (0.124) (0.138) (0.152)
  
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Department effects No No No No Yes Yes
  
Observations 1,344 1,232 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,232
Number of clusters 112 112 112 112 112 112
Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC)
3890.9 3,695.6 3,881.9 3,884.4 3,792.8 3,603.9
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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at low and especially high levels of local indigenous group size, providing 
clear evidence in favor of our conditional hypothesis. The effect is also sub-
stantively meaningful: At the 25th percentile of the indigenous share distribu-
tion (0.48), the expected event count is around 2, whereas at the 75th 
percentile (0.94), the expected event count is around 6. As the mean level of 
events in a province-year is around 2.88, a difference of four events suggests 
an important increase in contentious politics at the local level.
Models 2 to 6 test the robustness of our finding by successively adding 
various control variables. The model in column 2 includes our measure of 
government inclusion of local identity groups. While having an independent 
negative and statistically significant effect on the level of social conflict—
confirming related findings by Cederman et al. (2010)—including it as a con-
trol does not affect our main finding. This is noteworthy, as political exclusion 
at the national level might be an important alternative channel through which 
indigenous mobilization is facilitated. Importantly, our findings show that the 
election of Evo Morales as president and the successive inclusion of indige-
nous representatives at the national level had independent, dampening effects 
on the level of social conflict across Bolivian provinces, but did not affect our 
main finding of particularly high conflict levels in provinces that combine 
natural gas exploitation and a high share of indigenous people.
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Figure 3. Expected number of conflict events as a function of the share of the 
indigenous population (95% confidence intervals in gray).
Dark gray for provinces with gas, light gray for provinces without gas.
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Adding a measure of ethnic fractionalization or polarization (column 3) 
equally does not affect our finding, thus underlining that it is not the demo-
graphic constellation per se that matters for contentious politics, but rather 
the general mobilization potential of indigenous identity frames in the pres-
ence of resource extraction. Column 5 shows a model that adds our measure 
of crosscuttingness, again with no effect regarding our hypothesized interac-
tion. Models 5 and 6 add a set of departmental dummies and the full list of 
additional controls. These dummies control for any remaining time-invariant, 
unobserved effects at the department level. We still find no clear effect of the 
share of the indigenous population on social conflict in provinces without 
gas, but a clear amplification effect for provinces with gas.
Overall, the results suggest that gas plays an important catalytic role for 
indigenous contentious politics, but does it exert direct effects itself? Although 
the constituent effect of the gas variable is negative and statistically signifi-
cant, we cannot directly assess the effects of gas, as no province has an exact 
zero share of indigenous people. In other words, the positive interaction term 
has to be considered to some degree when assessing the effects of gas on 
contentious politics. A simulation of the effects for provinces at the 25th and 
75th percentile of the distribution of the indigenous share variable reveals 
that the effect is largely not distinguishable from zero (see Figure X1 in the 
online appendix). Only in provinces with a very high share of indigenous 
people does gas have a statistically significant effect, increasing the expected 
number of conflict events. This mirrors our main finding.
This result fits in with more recent studies of Basedau and Lay (2009) or 
Lujala and Rustad (2012), who conclude that natural resources are not con-
sistently conflict promoting—and their impact depends on further context 
conditions (albeit in contrast to these other studies we analyze low-level con-
flicts). In our case, it seems that the natural resource issue plays an important 
conditioning role for contentious politics within Bolivia, without exerting 
any direct effects on collective action. Although conflicts in resource-rich 
regions might not dominate, especially when considering the total sum of 
conflict events in Bolivia, they add an important dimension to the narrative of 
ethnic mobilization. This interpretation has also been supported by qualita-
tive assessments of researches queried in expert interviews during our field 
research.24
For further robustness checks, we repeat the estimation of all models 
including as additional control the total per capita revenue allocations to each 
province. This reduces the time frame of our analysis to 2006-2011. Adding 
revenue information to our models also has no effect on our substantive find-
ing. Although higher revenue allocations per capita increase conflict events, 
we still find in nearly all models clear evidence for the interactive effect 
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between gas resources and indigenous identity (detailed results shown in 
Online Appendix, Table X2). The positive effect of revenues per capita might 
represent the fact that local actors use social conflict to bargain over the dis-
tribution of local government resources.
We also utilize alternative information on the location of natural resources. 
We obtained information from the Bolivian Ministry of Natural Resources on 
the location of gas reserves. This information is highly correlated with the 
location of gas deposits recorded in the PETRO-DATA, but includes some 
additional, newer deposits. Based on this information, we create a simple 
dummy variable on the presence of gas reserves in a province and repeat our 
analysis.25 We again find clear evidence for the interaction between the pres-
ence of gas deposits and the share of the local indigenous population.
We also repeat our analysis only including conflict events that were clas-
sified as related to non-renewable natural resources (in the vast majority of 
cases meaning gas). Our argument implies that high-value natural resources 
should activate the general potential for social conflict of indigenous groups. 
Nonetheless, the underlying mechanisms of our argument also imply that we 
should see a particularly strong increase in resource-related conflict events 
for provinces that combine gas exploitation with a larger share of the indig-
enous population. We repeat the estimation of Models 1 to 6 from Table 1 
with just resource-related events included in the count and unambiguously 
confirm our initial findings. Across all six models, we find clear evidence of 
an interaction effect, with even higher levels of statistical significance. This 
increase in statistical precision is exactly what we would expect given our 
theoretical argument (see Online Appendix, Table X4). We also added esti-
mations that use the number of injured people as a dependent variable to 
further test the implications of our argument. We find that, on average, the 
injury count is highest in provinces that feature both a high share of indige-
nous people and gas deposits, followed by provinces that only have the for-
mer. Although the two scenarios are not statistically distinguishable at 
standard levels, the coefficients are in line with our argument, suggesting a 
more uncompromising position on the side of both conflicting parties (the 
overlap of confidence intervals might also stem from the more sporadic dis-
tribution of the injury counts, see Online Appendix for details).
For the last robustness check, we disaggregate the share of the indigenous 
population by subgroup. We include the share of Aymara, Quechua, and 
Guaraní, as well as their respective interactions with the gas variable. Overall, 
we find the same pattern as in the main analysis. Neither of the constituent 
terms for the indigenous groups has a statistically significant effect on social 
conflict in provinces without gas, but we do find positive and statistically 
significant interaction effects with gas, especially for Quechua and Aymara. 
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The fact that we find no such pattern for Guaraní might be due to their much 
smaller group size across Bolivia and not due to a missing conflict-promoting 
interaction effect, which actually has been illustrated by several qualitative 
micro-studies (see “Conflict Studies on Bolivia” section).
In summary, we find clear support for our hypothesis. The mobilization 
potential for indigenous populations can play an important role for conten-
tious politics. Using our detailed provincial-level data, we show that this con-
flict potential is capitalized on especially in gas-rich regions. These patterns 
hold even when controlling for a number of conceptually different aspects of 
ethnic or indigenous identity.
Conclusion
Numerous studies have argued that indigenous identity matters for conten-
tious politics. The difficulty lies with identifying the specific conditions 
under which it becomes politically salient enough to facilitate or activate 
social conflict. We argue that one such important contextual factor is natural 
resources. In the presence of valuable natural resources, usually under the 
control of the national government, local indigenous identity frames become 
less malleable, due to the fusing of indigenous and territorial identity. High-
value natural resources create stronger incentives for identification on a com-
bined ethno-territorial basis due to several not mutually exclusive factors: 
They generate large government revenues that can be claimed by local ethno-
territorial groups. Furthermore, resource extraction often has harmful envi-
ronmental consequences that endanger the traditional livelihood of the local 
population. The reason why this is especially true for indigenous people is 
that they not only engage more often in agricultural activities than non-indig-
enous groups of population, but they also have a stronger emotional or cul-
tural bond to their ancestral homeland. Especially the latter aspect also limits 
the range of acceptable bargains over territory. Indigenous territory might 
take on features of “indivisibility” (Hassner, 2003)—for both sides, indige-
nous groups and the state.
In addition, the state—due to the economic and strategic relevance of nat-
ural resource extraction—might be particularly susceptible to acts of conten-
tious politics, increasing the bargaining leverage of indigenous activists as 
well as fostering a unified “indigenous” identity from outside. Indigenous 
groups will be much more likely to successfully organize collective conten-
tious action, giving natural resources an important catalytic role. The increase 
in capability and disposition to engage in collective contentious action, espe-
cially against the state, also hold true beyond resource-related conflict issues.
We test this argument with novel, spatially and temporally disaggregated 
data from Bolivia. Systematically focusing on structural causes and not so 
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much on situational causes of conflict dynamics, as previous country-specific 
studies have done, our disaggregated quantitative analysis finds that—in 
accordance with our main hypothesis—there is a conflict-promoting effect of 
the interaction of gas reserves and indigenous groups. Although several other 
factors play an important role, notably the socio-economic environment, road 
infrastructure, and government inclusion, across a series of model specifica-
tions, we find clear evidence in favor of a conditional effect of the share of 
the indigenous population on social conflict.
Although promising, our analysis also has some limitations. First, due to 
the rarity of events with fatalities, and missing data on the size of conflict 
events, we are unable to explore quantitatively the factors promoting escala-
tions from simple protests and strikes to more violent forms of anti-govern-
mental collective action. We are also unable to distinguish in our data between 
the specific sequence of escalation from the side of the government or indig-
enous groups. It is likely that conflict over natural resources affects the menu 
of contentious acts used by activists, as well as the type of protest policing 
used by government actors. As some episodes of contentious politics in 
Bolivia have featured more violent altercations between groups, we hope to 
explore further the issue of violent escalation in a qualitative micro-level 
study. Second, to measure the role of indigenous identity, we had to rely on 
the given categories of self-identification in the census, which might be insuf-
ficient to map all relevant cleavages in the Bolivian society and might fur-
thermore not be entirely be transferred to other contexts.
Despite the mentioned shortcomings, the associational patterns we iden-
tify are important for developing a better understanding for contentious poli-
tics in Bolivia and beyond: Our argument and empirical findings contribute 
to the broader research literature on contentious politics by making an inno-
vative conditional argument about the role of indigenous identity for social 
conflict. Although we have especially focused on indigenous identity, we 
believe our findings also inform the more general debate on the links between 
ethnic identity and conflict. Moreover, we provide specific arguments as to 
which conditions favor the emergence of a politicized identity frame. This 
establishes an important link to existing research on the role of ethnic identity 
and natural resources for armed conflict. We believe both research programs 
could benefit from more cross-fertilization (e.g., recent work by Stephan & 
Chenoweth, 2008, equally attempts to bridge the gap between studies of 
armed conflict and non-violent resistance). Our empirical analysis also aims 
to transfer successful empirical research designs from recent work on civil 
wars to the analysis of contentious politics. Our explicit focus on sub-national 
and temporal variation in social conflict within one country, while somewhat 
limiting the generalizability of our findings, offers important advantages over 
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the study of single cases or cross-national work. Our findings speak to broader 
patterns in contentious politics around the world that reflect increasing con-
flict potential over natural resources, as well as ongoing (violent) tensions in 
ethnically heterogeneous countries. Finally, our article also makes a valuable 
contribution to the country-specific research discourse on contentious poli-
tics in Bolivia, providing for the first time a comprehensive quantitative over-
view on the spatial distribution of conflict events, allowing us to match 
existing arguments in the literature on Bolivia against firmer empirical 
grounding. We hope this will spur further research on contentious politics in 
Bolivia.
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Notes
 1. In this study, we focus specifically on the role of indigenous identity for social 
conflict. Indigenous identity, being closely related to, but still not entirely identi-
cal with the more general concept of ethnic identity is of particular importance 
to the Bolivian context. Nonetheless, we believe our theoretical argument and 
empirical analysis also informs on the relationship between ethnic identities and 
conflict more generally.
 2. Classical resource mobilization approaches (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 2002; 
Minkoff, 1993) have instead more generally studied the impact of “resources” 
including material but also of non-material resources such as organizational 
structures—without paying special interest to the impact of natural resource 
abundance.
 3. The term of “natural resources” as used by UNIR not only includes hydrocar-
bons but also mining and land.
 4. Although there is a general historical increase in the importance of the concept of 
indigenous identity in Latin America since the end of the 20th century (Postero, 
2013), this identity concept is still characterized by a rather high level of fluidity.
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 5. The strong bond between indigenous people and “their” territory may for exam-
ple be underlined by the importance of the concept of “Pachamama” (mother 
earth) within identity construction of several indigenous groups, especially 
Quechuas and Aymaras.
 6. Thus, during a workshop organized by one of the authors with the local indige-
nous organization of the Guaraní, the AGP of Yacuiba, in August 2013 indigenous 
representatives commented on the negotiations with the government concerning 
the construction of a new gas plant with the following words: “no ha sido un 
diálogo más al contrario ha sido una imposición del gobierno.” Moreover, in 
the introductory speech of the workshop a representative of the AGP stressed 
the long historical entrenchment of the “pueblo guaraní en la zona del Chaco” 
saying that “ . . . 1733 nosotros ya existíamos en este lugar, que los colones, los 
espanoles o los franciscanos nos han “descubierto” acá.”
 7. We use the term of “issues of indivisibility” to dissociate from the concept of 
indivisibility in the very strict sense of “indivisibility of sacred places” used by 
Hassner (2003), which would actually leave “no room for compromise and no 
substitute for the disputed space” (p. 24).
 8. With the exception only of the year 2000, when Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) registers a non-state low level conflict with 50 fatalities in a land dispute 
between the ethnic groups of Qaqachacas and Laimes at the border between the 
departments of Oruro and Potosí.
 9. The UNIR conflict data set can be found in http://nueva.unirbolivia.org/~unir/
nueva3/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=443&Itemid=21.
10. The data sources of CLACSO are accessible from http://www.clacso.org.ar/
institucional/1h.php. Since 2005, tCLACSO’s Bolivian conflict chronologies are 
additionally based on up to two Bolivian press agencies.
11. Common forms of these conflicts are protest marches, strikes, (road) blockages, 
riots, or turmoil.
12. A preliminary and shortened version of the codebook of our conflict data set can 
be found in the annex. The complete data set will soon be published.
13. As a result of the low number of deaths in our statistical analysis, we are not able 
to differentiate between conflict events with and without fatalities, neither can 
we evaluate varying intensity of conflict events in terms of the number of actors 
participating in a conflict event. The number of reported injuries is 2,553, which 
we use in our robustness checks as an alternative measure for the intensity of 
social conflict.
14. We attempted to obtain similar geo-referenced data on mining activities from 
Bolivia’s Department of Mining, but have remained unsuccessful as of date.
15. Moreover, there is a rather small compensation fund for the non-gas-producing 
departments of Beni and Pando.
16. Our count includes active and inactive deposits.
17. Socio-economic development is measured as a simple index based on whether 
the household had access to electricity, and piped water and whether they lived 
in a dwelling with an earth floor.
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18. Capital distance and mountainous terrain at the provincial level comes from the 
PRIO-GRID data, which we matched to the Bolivian provinces.
19. Data on revenue allocations come from official publications by the Ministry of 
Economics and Financial Affairs. These allocations do not reflect allocations 
at the departmental level or measure exact revenue allocations based only on 
natural resource revenue. As fiscal resources are fungible, we believe the overall 
fiscal allocation is the best way to capture attempts by the central government to 
buy off the local population.
20. Thus, we can control for the potential effect of a vaguely defined “regional iden-
tity” of the department of Santa Cruz, which has been quoted by several authors 
for being responsible for higher conflictivity in this department.
21. Fixed effects negative binomial models, as implemented for example by the sta-
tistical software STATA, rely on conditional maximum likelihood. Allison and 
Waterman (2002) show that these models do not control for time-invariant unob-
served factors. They instead recommend as a simple approximation the use of 
unit dummies. The incidental parameters problem will also be less of a concern 
in our models, as we only include dummies at the departmental, not the provin-
cial level.
22. Control variables were set at their means. The effects were simulated in the sta-
tistical software package R.
23. One of the authors carried out 3 months of fieldwork in Bolivia. Organizing 
focus-group interviews as well as semi-structured interviews with local indig-
enous representatives and indigenous villagers, she assessed central uttered 
grievances and further aspects of identity frames in different gas-extracting and 
non-gas-extracting regions within the lowland areas in Bolivia.
24. Given the nature of the information, we were not able to extract the number of 
distinct gas fields for each province.
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